Abstract To simplify proofs in information-theoretic security, the standard security definition of two-party secure function evaluation based on the real/ideal model paradigm is often replaced by an informationtheoretic security definition. At EUROCRYPT 2006, we showed that most of these definitions had some weaknesses, and presented new information-theoretic conditions that were equivalent to a simulation-based definition in the real/ideal model. However, there we only considered the perfect case, where the protocol is not allowed to make any error, which has only limited applications. We generalize these results to the statistical case, where the protocol is allowed to make errors with a small probability. Our results are based on a new measure of information that we call the statistical information, which may be of independent interest.
Introduction
Secure function evaluation [1] allows two (or more) parties to jointly compute a function in a secure way, which means that no player may get additional information about the other players' inputs or outputs, other than what may be deduced from their own input and output. A computationally secure solution to this problem has been given in [2] . Schemes ensuring unconditional security were subsequently provided in [3] and independently in [4] .
Oblivious transfer [5, 6, 7] is a simple primitive of central interest in secure function evaluation. It allows a sender to send one of n binary strings of length k to a receiver. The primitive allows the receiver to receive the string of his choice while concealing this choice from a (possibly dishonest) sender. On the other hand, a dishonest receiver cannot obtain information about more than one of the strings, including partial joint information on two or more strings. It has since been proved that oblivious transfer is in fact sufficient by itself to securely compute any function [8, 9] . More completeness results followed in [10, 11, 12, 13 ].
Security Definitions
Formal security definitions for secure function evaluation have been proposed in [14] and [15] . Both definitions were inspired by the simulation paradigm used in [16] to define zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. These definitions require that for any adversary, there exists a simulated adversary in an ideal setting (which is secure by definition) that achieves the same. That protocols which satisfy these definitions are sequentially composable has been proved in [17] . See also [18] .
Later, a stronger notion of security, called universal composability, has been defined in [19] and independently in [20] . It guarantees that protocols are securely composable in any way.
Even though simulation-based security definitions are widely accepted as being the right definition of security today, ad-hoc definitions are still widely used due to their simplicity. Unfortunately, as we showed in [21] , many of these definitions proposed for various specific scenarios have turned out to be deficient. We proposed in [21] simple information-theoretic conditions for the security of function evaluation, and proved that they are equivalent to the standard definition in the real/ideal model. However, these conditions could only be applied in the perfect case, when the protocol does not have any failure probability and does not leak any information, and therefore had only a very limited range of applications. For the special case of randomized oblivious transfer, these conditions have been generalized in [22] to the statistical case, where the protocol is allowed to make errors with a small probability.
Information Measures
The Shannon mutual information has been introduced in [23] , and is one of the most important tools in information theory, as a measure of how many bits of information one random variable has over the other. The mutual information tells us for example how many bits can be transmitted over a noisy channel.
In information-theoretic cryptography, the mutual information has also been used in security definitions, to express that an adversary obtains almost no information about some secret, i.e., that two random variables are almost independent. But since in cryptography we are not interested in how many bits the adversary gets, but in the probability that he gets any information at all, the mutual information is not a good measure for that task.
Contribution
First, we propose a new measure of information that we call the statistical information, which is better suited to express security conditions than the mutual information. The difference between the statistical and the mutual information is the distance measure they are based on: while the mutual information is based on the relative entropy, the statistical information is based on the statistical distance.
Then we will generalize the results from [21] and [22] . We present necessary and sufficient information theoretic conditions for any two-party secure function evaluation in the statistical case, and apply them to oblivious transfer. The statistical information plays a very important role to state these conditions.
Related Work
Recently, Fehr and Schaffner showed in [24] that similar results also hold in the quantum setting. They presented security conditions for quantum protocols where the honest players have classical input and output, and showed that any quantum protocol that satisfies these conditions can be used as a sub-protocol in a classical protocol.
Preliminaries
For a random variable X, we denote its distribution by P X and its domain by X . P Y |X = P XY /P X denotes a conditional probability distribution, which models a probabilistic function that takes x as input and outputs y, distributed according to P Y |X=x . Definition 1. The statistical distance between two distributions P X and P X over X is defined as δ(P X , P X ) = 1 2
If δ(P X , P X ) ≤ ε, we may also write P X ≡ ε P X or X ≡ ε X . We will need the following basic properties of δ.
Lemma 1 (Triangle Inequality). For any distributions P X , P X and P X , we have
Lemma 2 (Data Processing). For any distributions P XY and P X Y , we have
Lemma 3. For any distributions P X and P X , and any conditional distribution P Y |X , we have
Lemma 4. For any distributions P X and P X we have δ(P X , P Y ) ≤ ε, if and only if there exist events E X and E Y with Pr[
In this section, we introduce the statistical information I S . While the mutual information uses relative entropy as the underlying distance measure, we will use the statistical distance. Its value tells us how close the distribution of three random variables X, Y and Z is to a Markov-chain.
Definition 2. The statistical information of X and Y given Z is defined as
Obviously, this measure is non-negative and symmetric in X and Y . We will now show more properties of I S , which are related to similar properties of the mutual information.
Lemma 5 (Chain rule). For all P W XY Z , we have
Proof. We have
From Lemma 3 follows that
Using Lemma 1 and P W X|Z = P W |Z P X|W Z , we get
Lemma 6 (Monotonicity). For all P W XY Z , we have
Proof. Using Lemma 2, we get
Note that there exist P XY Z and Q ZX Q Y |Z , where
so P Z P X|Z P Y |Z is not always the closest Markov-chain to P XY Z . Luckily, as the following two lemmas show, P Z P X|Z P Y |Z is only by a factor of 4 away from the optimal Markov-chain, which is sufficient for our applications 3 .
Lemma 7. For all probability distributions P XY Z , we have
Proof. Let Q Y |Z be the conditional probability distribution that minimizes the expression, and let ε := δ(P XY Z , P XZ Q Y |Z ). We have
Lemma 8. For all probability distributions P XY Z , we have
Proof. Let Q XZ and Q Y |Z be the conditional probability distributions that minimize the expression, and let ε := δ(P XY Z , Q XZ Q Y |Z ). From Lemma 2 follows that δ(P XZ , Q XZ ) ≤ ε and from Lemma 3 that
The statement follows by applying Lemma 7.
Lemma 9. For all P W XY Z , we have
Proof. From Lemma 7 follows that
Relation between I and I S
Since we would like to use I S in situations where previously the Shannon mutual information I has been used, it is important to know how these two measures relate to each other. Using Pinsker's inequality (see, for example, Lemma 16.3.1 in [25] ) and Jensen's inequality, it is easy to show that
The other direction can be shown using Lemma 12.6.1 from [25] . We get that for
3 Two-party Secure Function Evaluation
Definition of Security in the Real/Ideal Paradigm
We will now give a definition of secure function evaluation based on the real/ideal model paradigm. We use the same definitions as [21] , which are based on Definition 7.2.10 of [18] (see also [17] ). Let x ∈ X denote the input of the first party, y ∈ Y the input of the second party and z ∈ {0, 1} * an additional auxiliary input available to both parties, that is ignored by all honest parties. A g-hybrid protocol is a pair of (randomized) algorithms Π = (A 1
* in the real model, denoted by
is defined as the output pair resulting from the interaction between A 1 (x, z) and A 2 (y, z) using the functionality g. The ideal model defines the optimal setting where the players have access to an ideal functionality f they wish to compute. The trivial f -hybrid protocol B = (B 1 , B 2 ) is defined as the protocol where both parties send their inputs x and y unchanged to the functionality f and output the values u and v received from f unchanged. Let B = (B 1 , B 2 ) be an admissible pair of algorithms for B. The joint execution of f under B in the ideal model on input pair (x, y) ∈ X × Y and auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1} * , denoted by
is defined as the output pair resulting from the interaction between B 1 (x, z) and B 2 (y, z) using the functionality f . We say that a protocol securely computes a functionality, if anything an adversary can do in the real model can be simulated in the ideal model.
Definition 3 (Statistical Security).
A g-hybrid protocol Π securely computes f with an error of at most ε if for every pair of algorithms A = (A 1 , A 2 ) that is admissible in the real model for the protocol Π, there exists a pair of algorithms B = (B 1 , B 2 ) that is admissible in the ideal model for protocol B (and where the same players are honest), such that for all x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, and z ∈ {0, 1} * , we have
A very important property of the above definition is that it implies sequential composition, see [17] . Note that in contrast to [17] or [18] , we do not require the simulation to be efficiently computable.
The following lemma formalizes the idea already mentioned in [21] , namely that if a protocol is secure against adversaries without auxiliary input, then it is also secure against adversaries with auxiliary input. To avoid that the ideal adversary with auxiliary input gets infinitely big, we have to additionally require that there exists an explicit construction of the ideal adversary without auxiliary input.
Lemma 10. If a g-hybrid protocol Π securely computes f with an error ε against adversaries with constant auxiliary input and the construction of the ideal adversary is explicit, then it securely computes f with an error of at most ε.
Proof. If both players are honest the auxiliary input is ignored and the lemma holds. Let player i be malicious and denote by A i the algorithm used. For a fixed z ∈ {0, 1} * , let A z i be equal to A i , but with the auxiliary input z hard-wired into it. Since Π securely computes f with an error ε against adversaries with constant auxiliary input, there exists an algorithm B z i , such that for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, we have
z (x, y) . Now, we let B i be the concatenation of all B z i , i.e., on auxiliary input z the adversary B i behaves as B z i . Note that since we have an explicit construction of B z i , B i has a finite description. Obviously, we have for all x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, and z ∈ {0, 1} * that
Hence, Π securely computes f with an error of at most ε.
Therefore, to show the security of a protocol in our model, the auxiliary input can be omitted, which we will do for the rest of this paper.
Information-Theoretic Conditions for Security
We will now state our main results, which are information-theoretic conditions for the statistical security of a protocol without the use of an ideal model.
First of all, we will slightly change our notation. Let X and Y be random variables denoting the player's inputs, distributed according to a distribution P XY unknown to the players, and let U and V be random variables denoting the outputs of the two parties, i.e., for specific inputs (x, y) we have
The security condition of Definition 3 can be expressed as
To simplify the statement of the following theorem, we will assume that the ideal functionality f is deterministic. It can be generalized to probabilistic functionalities without any problems.
The conditions for the security for player 1 must ensure that there exists an ideal adversary that achieves almost the same as the real adversary. We achieve this by requiring that there exists a virtual input value Y that the adversary could have created (this is ensured by I S (X; Y | Y ) ≈ 0), and a virtual output value V that, together with U , could be the output of the ideal functionality, given X and Y as input (this is ensured by Pr[(U, V ) = f (X, Y )] ≈ 1). The protocol is secure if the adversary's output V could have been calculated by him from Y , Y and V , which is ensured by I S (U X; V | Y Y V ) ≈ 0. Theorem 1. A protocol Π securely computes the deterministic functionality f with an error of at most 3ε, if for every pair of algorithms A = (A 1 , A 2 ) that is admissible in the real model for the protocol Π and for any input (X, Y ) distributed according to P XY over X × Y, A produces outputs (U, V ) distributed according to P U V |XY , such that the following conditions are satisfied:
-(Correctness) If both players are honest, we have
-(Security for Player 1) If player 1 is honest then there exist random variables Y and V distributed according to
-(Security for Player 2) If player 2 is honest then there exist random variables X and U distributed according to P X U |XY U V such that
Both P Y V |XY U V and P X U |XY U V should have explicit constructions.
Proof. If both players are honest, the correctness condition implies
for all x and y. If both players are malicious nothing needs to be shown. Without loss of generality, let player 1 be honest and player 2 be malicious. Let us for the moment assume that the input distribution P XY is fixed and known to the adversary, so the joint distribution in the real model is
We will define an admissible protocol B = (B 1 , B 2 ) in the ideal model that produces almost the same output distribution as the protocol Π in the real model. On input y, let B 2 choose his input y according to P Y |Y =y , which we model by the channel P Y |Y . After receiving v from the ideal functionality f , let B 2 choose his output v according to P V |Y =y,Y =y ,V =v , which we model by the channel P V |Y Y V . The distribution of the input/output in the ideal model is given by
In the real model, it follows from I S (X; Y | Y ) ≤ ε that
and from Pr[(U, V ) = f (X, Y )] ≥ 1 − ε and Lemma 4 that
We have
Therefore, given P XY , we are able to construct an adversary in the ideal model that simulates the output of the real protocol with an error of at most 3ε. However, we have to show that a fixed adversary in the ideal model works for every input (x, y) ∈ X × Y.
4
Given P XY , let e be the average error of the simulation, and let e xy be the error if the input is (x, y). We have e = x,y P XY (x, y)·e xy . Let h(P XY ) → P XY a function that maps from the space of all distribution over X ×Y to itself, where
h is a continuous 5 function from a non-empty, compact, convex set S ⊂ R |X ×Y| into itself, so by Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem h must have a fixed point distribution Q XY . (A constructive proof of Brower's Fixed Point Theorem can be found in [26] .) So we have for all (x, y) that
and Q XY (x, y) > 0, and hence e xy = e. Therefore, by taking the adversary in the ideal model for the input distribution Q XY , the output will have the same error e for all inputs. Since e ≤ 3ε, we get for all x and y
which implies that the protocol is secure with an error of at most 3ε.
Theorem 2 now shows that our conditions are not only sufficient but also necessary.
Theorem 2. If a protocol Π securely computes the deterministic functionality f with an error of at most ε, then for every pair of algorithms A = (A 1 , A 2 ) that is admissible in the real model for the protocol Π and for any input (X, Y ) distributed according to P XY over X × Y, A produces outputs (U, V ) distributed according to P U V |XY , such that the following conditions are satisfied:
-(Security for Player 1) If player 1 is honest then there exist random variables Y and V distributed according to P Y V |U V XY such that
-(Security for Player 2) If player 2 is honest then there exist random variables X and U distributed according to P X U |U V XY such that
Proof. There exists an admissible pair of algorithms B = (B 1 , B 2 ) for the ideal model such that for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, we have
If both players are honest we have B = B. B 1 and B 2 forward their inputs (X, Y ) unchanged to the trusted third party, get back (U , V ) := f (X, Y ) and output
Without loss of generality, let player 1 be honest and player 2 be malicious. Let us look at the execution of B = (B 1 , B 2 ), and let P XY be an arbitrary input distribution. The malicious B 2 can be modeled by the two conditional probability distributions P Y S|Y computing the input to the ideal functionality f and some internal data S, and P V |V S computing the output. We get
where
From P U V XY ≡ ε P U V XY and Lemma 3 follows that
and from Lemma 2 follows P XY U V ≡ ε P XY U V , and therefore
Oblivious Transfer
We now apply Theorem 1 to 1-out-of-n string oblivious transfer, or n 1 -OT k for short. The ideal functionality f OT is defined as f OT (X, C) := (⊥, X C ), where ⊥ denotes a constant random variable, X = (X 0 , . . . , X n−1 ), X i ∈ {0, 1} k for i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, and C ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. A 2 ) that is admissible for protocol Π and for any input (X, C), A produces outputs (U, V ) such that the following conditions are satisfied:
-(Security for Player 1) If player 1 is honest, then we have U = ⊥ and there exists a random variable C distributed according to P C |XCV , such that I S (X; C | C) ≤ ε , and I S (X; V | CC X C ) ≤ ε .
-(Security for Player 2) If player 2 is honest, we have V ∈ {0, 1} k and I S (C; U | X) ≤ ε .
Proof. We need to show that these conditions imply the conditions of Theorem 1 for ε := 2ε. For correctness and the security for player 1 this is trivial. For the security for player 2, we choose X = (X 0 , . . . , X n−1 ) as follows: for all values i, let X i be chosen according to the distribution P V |XU,C=i except for X C . We set X C = V . Note that all X i , 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, have distribution P V |XU,C=i . Thus X does not depend on C given XU , and we have I S (C; X | XU ) = 0. From Lemma 5 follows that I S (C; X U | X) ≤ I S (C; U | X) + I S (C; X | XU ) ≤ ε .
Lemmas 6 implies that I S (C; X | X) ≤ ε and, since V is a function of X and C, it follows from Lemma 9 that I S (V C; U | XX ) = I S (C; U | XX ) ≤ 2 · I S (C; X U | X) ≤ 2ε .
The statements follows by applying Theorem 1.
Furthermore, note that using Lemmas 5 and 6, we get I S (C; U | X) ≤ I S (C; X U | X) ≤ I S (C; X | X) + I S (C; U | XX ) ≤ I S (C; X | X) + I S (V C; U | XX ) , from which it is easy to show that the conditions of Theorem 1 also imply the conditions in Theorem 3.
